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ABSTRACT: A process to carry out independent design reviews of structural designs was developed in Waterman Moylan
Engineering Consultants in 2015 to complement existing quality management procedures. This process has been successful in
highlighting and addressing issues during the design phase, thus reducing re-work and risk of issues carrying through to the
construction phase. This paper presents an evaluation of issues found during 36 design reviews carried out between 2015 and
2020. The purpose of this paper is to improve awareness of recurring design issues and disseminate lessons learned from the
design reviews.
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INTRODUCTION

In many parts of the world statutory peer reviews of structural
designs are a requirement of building regulations. The core
purpose of a review is to ensure the safety of a design through
the identification of human error. It is, therefore, of interest to
study design errors that have caused structural failures as well
as statutory design review processes that have been developed
primarily in reaction to these failures.
The design review process developed in Waterman Moylan, as
well as an evaluation of design reviews carried out by the
Author between 2015 and 2020, are presented in this paper.
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BACKGROUND
Independent Design Reviews

Requirements for independent checking of building designs
vary across the globe. The following section sets out the
position in a number of jurisdictions.
In 2008, New York City Department of Buildings introduced a
requirement for structural peer reviews of buildings that meet
certain criteria. Included are major structures that would meet
Consequence Class 3 criteria in Eurocode 0, and buildings
greater than 7 stories that require consideration of
disproportionate collapse. In the past, structural design reviews
had been performed by the Department of Buildings, however
these were ceased in 1975 [1]. Peer reviews are carried out by
principals of engineering companies based in New York with
sufficient technical qualifications to carry out the review.
Miami Florida, also introduced a requirement for peer reviews
based on New York City’s model.
In the UK, the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB)
[2] requires different levels of checking of designs of bridges
in various Consequence Classes. An independent review is
required for Consequence Class 3 structures. No such statutory
requirements are in place for building structures.
In Scotland, a system was introduced in 2004 for certifying
compliance of building structures with the building regulations.
To certify building designs, one must be an Approved Certifier.

Different levels of checking are required depending on the
Consequence Class of the structure. Third party design reviews
are a requirement for Consequence Class 3 structures.
In Australia, independent design reviews are only a statutory
requirement in the state of Victoria at present. However, in
2017, a report was commissioned on behalf of the Building
Minister’s Forum to undertake an assessment on the
compliance and enforcement systems for the building industry
[3]. The report recommended that independent third-party
reviews be carried in each territory for certain building types.
In 2019, Engineers Australia, responding to the report
recommended mandatory peer assessments for buildings of
importance levels 3, 4 and 5 in accordance with Australian
Standard AS/NZS 1170.0 [4]. These importance levels describe
buildings with a high consequence of failure, similar to
Consequence Class 3 structures in the Eurocode 0, where third
party checking of calculations, drawings and specifications is
recommended [5].
In Ireland, as in the UK, independent design reviews are
required for certain bridge structures. Again, there is no
statutory requirement to have independent design reviews
carried out for building structures. The Building Control
(Amendment) Regulations, updated in 2014 requires that an
Assigned Certifier be appointed to provide design certification
as well as inspections during construction to ensure compliance
with the Building Regulations. However, design certification is
provided without a design review of structural documentation
being carried out.
The introduction of independent design reviews as a
statutory requirement has generally been in response to
structural failures or poor building practice. For example, the
UK DMRB introduced independent checking in the early
1970’s following failures of bridges in Australia, Wales,
Germany and Austria [2]. The 16th Biennial report from
SCOSS (Standing Committee on Structural Safety) notes that
“history shows us that in order to ensure compliance there
needs to be independent assessment and supervision.” [6].
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Design Errors and Structural Failures
Design errors have been found to be the primary cause of 2535% of structural failures globally [7]. There have been
extensive studies that discuss recurring design errors and the
root causes of these errors that contribute to failures [8], [9],
[10]. Some are listed below:
•
Foundation movement;
•
Connection failures;
•
Buckling;
•
Lack of bracing;
•
Overloading;
•
Fatigue;
•
Inadequate structural redundancy;
•
Calculation errors;
•
Misusing computer software;
•
Constructability problems;
•
Unclearly communicated design intent;
•
Contractual inhibitions;
•
Inappropriate application / use of the design codes;
•
Human error;
•
Lack of experience of the designer.
SCOSS uses a 3P’s model to illustrate the broad range of issues
on risk in structural safety, refer to Table 1 [10]. It is clear that
many interrelated factors contribute to design errors and not
simply technical errors. These include management and
organisational factors as well as time and cost pressures [11].
Many errors in construction documentation are found during
construction and never result in a failure, however these issues
often cause re-work and can increase the project contract cost
by 5% [12]. Some of these errors in fact lead to independent
design reviews, for example in 2019, in New South Wales,
Australia, during construction of a 7-storey building, a potential
issue was highlighted by a sub-contractor. The developer chose
to have an independent review of the design carried out. Major
flaws in the design were uncovered resulting in remedial works
to the basement that had been already constructed [13].
Engineering design companies often have checking
procedures as part of their quality assurance procedures, but
this is not always the case. Design errors can be reduced
significantly when design checks are carried out in design
offices. Research has shown that design checks can detect 32%
of errors if carried out in-house and if independent parties are
used then up to 55% of design errors can be eliminated [14].
While independent design reviews are useful in detecting
design errors, they can be also be useful in knowledge sharing,
which can drive standards and quality [1]. Furthermore, lessons
can be learned from previous projects and used to guide
appropriate training and knowledge development for younger
engineers.
Design Review Process at Waterman Moylan
The review process in Waterman Moylan began in 2015.
Reviews are most often carried out just before the tender issue.
On very large projects, a scheme stage review is often carried
out also, prior to 40% design documentation when there is still
scope to affect the design in a positive manner [15]. At scheme
stage, it is possible to assess the appropriateness of the
structural scheme, buildability, materials used, and detailing for
simplicity and ease of construction. Carrying out the
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Table 1. Broad range of influences on structural safety [10]
review at tender stage allows for amendments to the design or
omissions to be included in the Tenderer’s price. Post tender,
there can be resistance contractually to making alterations.
One drawback of carrying out the review at tender stage is
that RC drawings have generally not been produced. Often, it
is in the detailing where issues arise.
The following tasks are performed on each review:
1. Design Loadings. Confirm that the appropriate loads and
load cases have been considered.
2. Design Criteria. Confirm that the structural design criteria
are in accordance with codes of practice and design
assumptions are appropriate.
3. Calculations. Perform independent calculations for a
representative number of elements including columns, beams,
floor slabs and transfer structure to check their adequacy.
Review structural analysis and finite element model
assumptions, inputs and outputs versus independent hand
calculations (where available).
4. Load paths. Review load paths and overall loads on columns
& foundations, on area basis.
5. Lateral Stability. Check overall system and load path down
to foundations.
6. Robustness/Accidental Loading. Review ties, loads, and
confirm code provisions have been complied with.
7. Foundations. Review geotechnical investigations, confirm
that the foundation and structural design properly incorporates
the results and recommendations of the investigations including
contamination, gas and water level.
8. Basements. Review principles of design, tanking, and
potential for buoyancy.
9. Performance-specified structural components (such as
certain temporary works and precast concrete elements). Verify
that these have been appropriately specified and coordinated
with the primary building structure.
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10. Drawings, BIM models and specifications. Check clarity,
presentation and completeness of information. Confirm that the
structural plans and BIM models are in general conformance
with the architectural plans regarding loads and other
conditions that may affect the structural design.
11. Fire Protection. Review fire rating and method used.
12. Health and Safety Risks. Review risk assessment, design
stage mitigation measures, and any remaining risks.

Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the structural solutions
used in the buildings reviewed.

STRUCTURAL SOLUTION
UTILISED
6% 3%

Following the review, a written report is provided to the project
lead along with comments marked on the structural drawings.
The report also includes lessons learned, and recommendations
for future projects. The project lead responds to the comments
either accepting the comment, clarifying the structural design
intent or disagreeing with the comment. Following the response
to the report, a meeting between the reviewer and project lead
is held to close out the comments and responses. Generally,
issues are resolved here or a difference of opinion is accepted.
This is can in fact be a positive outcome [15].
3

5%
8%
11%
17%

EVALUATION OF REVIEWS

An evaluation of design issues found during reviews was
carried out. The study sought to assess whether common issues
in designs existed across different structure types and design
teams. The evaluation was limited to issues that were identified
in the reviews and were agreed with by the project lead. Each
of these issues resulted in a revision to the structural
documentation. Differences of opinion and issues that did not
affect safety or utility of structure were not included. The
evaluation is the subjective opinion of the Author. It is possible
that a different engineer may have drawn different conclusions
during the evaluation and may have found a slightly different
set of issues in each review. The review findings from housing
projects as well as refurbishment projects have been omitted,
as these projects typically have different sets of issues.
The approach consisted of the categorisation of issues
identified into the following groups:
•
Members supporting vertical loading at ULS
•
Members resisting wind / lateral loading
•
Foundations
•
Robustness
Design issues found in various member types were collated
together along with the primary failure mode for each element
and the likely primary cause of the design issue. The results are
tabulated in the following sections.
There were 36 projects in total reviewed. Figure 1 provides a
breakdown of the building types.

BUILDING USE
Retail
11%

Educational
17%

Hotel
8%

Residential
28%
Prison
6%

Industrial
8%
Office
22%

Figure 1. Breakdown of Projects by Building Use.

22%

28%

RC Frame with Flat Slabs
PC Frame over RC Frame with Transfer Slab

Load Bearing Masonry Walls / Precast Flooring /
Steel Frame Roof
RC Frame with PT flat slabs
Steel Frame / Cellular Floor Beams / Composite
Shallow Steel Deck
Load Bearing Masonry Walls / Precast Flooring /
Steel Frame Roof over RC Frame with Transfer Slab
Warehouse: Steel Portal Frame
Steel Frame / RC Cores / Shallow Floor Beams /
Precast Flooring
Figure 2. Breakdown of Projects by Structural Solution.
Consequence Class: There were two Consequence Class 3
structures, twenty-five Consequence Class 2B structures and 9
Consequence Class 2A structures in the sample. Commentary
is provided on a number of the important findings.
4

RESULTS

KEY:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
I.
II.
III.
/

Element within structure
No. of projects with occurrences of issues
No. of projects that utilise element
Percentage of projects where issue was found
Most common issue with element
Primary cause of issue
Lack of experience by designer
Human error
Inappropriate use of design codes
Not evaluated
Members supporting vertical loads at ULS

The following table presents a summary of results of the
evaluation of members supporting vertical loads.
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A

B

C

D

E

F

RC Column
RC Transfer
Slab
Steel Beam
RC Basement
Slab
Steel Column
Masonry Pier
RC Flat Slab
RC Transfer
Beam
Precast Pier
PT Flat Slab
RC Beam
Steel Transfer
Beam
Precast Floor
RC Transfer
Wall

8

24

33%

Buckling

I

6

10

60%

Bending / Shear

I

4

14

29%

Bending

II

4

12

33%

Buoyancy

II

3
3
2

10
8
9

30%
38%
22%

Buckling
Compression
Punching Shear

III
II
II

2

5

40%

Bending / Shear

I

1
1
1

/
/
/

/
/
/

/
/
/

1

/

/

/

1

/

/

/

1

/

/

/

elements being supported, often results in the actual loads
carried by transfer structures being underestimated.
In building models where transfer structures support long
walls (for example residential and hotel buildings), the walls
that are stacked through the building tend to be much stiffer
than the transfer slabs that support them. The walls tend to
‘hang’ the transfer slab under, providing support to it, and
distributing the load back towards the stiff points such as
supporting columns. There are several reasons why this is not
a realistic representation of how the structure will act in reality.
The walls would have to be designed for high tension forces
and the bearing stresses at the ends of the walls are often well
beyond design limits. If the walls are to be constructed of
precast concrete, the joints in the walls create discontinuities.
These joints are typically not designed for the forces that would
need to be transmitted here. Figure 3 shows an extract from a
finite element analysis model showing arching of walls, tensile
forces developed and high bearing stresses over a column
support.

Table 1. Results of evaluation of issues found in members
supporting vertical loads.
There were eight instances of design issues with columns.
These columns tended to be over capacity by codified
calculations for buckling due to slenderness effects. This
accounts for 33% of projects where RC columns were used.
Slender columns are quite sensitive to magnitude of bending
moment, and if the moment is applied in an incorrect direction,
it can have a marked effect on the effective length of the column
for buckling. Of course, a non-linear analysis could have been
carried out in order to justify a design by directly calculating
the 2nd order effects, which may show that the magnified
moment is less than that calculated by simplified code rules.
In assessing the risk associated with this design issue,
columns identified were often in office buildings where actual
measured imposed loads are typically much lower than those
stipulated by clients [16]. Nonetheless, to address the issues,
columns were typically increased in size, higher concrete
strengths were specified or additional reinforcement was
added.
There were six projects where some amendment was required
to transfer slab designs. This amounted to 60% of projects
where transfer slabs were used. Often these issues were
localized, where the transfer slabs were insufficient by
calculation for either bending, punching shear or face shear.
Four projects required localized or general increases in the
depth of the transfer slab and two projects required
amendments to detailing of shear reinforcement. Two projects
had issues with RC transfer beams undersized in bending and
shear. Both projects required increases to the size of transfer
beam.
One of the primary causes of issues found in transfer beams
and slabs appeared to be a lack of experience by designers in
modelling and in interpreting results. Issues around the use of
computer software and analyzing results are well documented
[17]. Modelling without consideration of the stiffness of
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Figure 3. Extract from Finite Element Analysis Model of a
transfer slab supporting long walls.
When transfer slabs are modelled to support columns at a
change of grid between floors (for example in an office over a
car park), the loading from the columns supported on the
transfer slab causes it to deflect. Columns that continue below
the transfer slab and are not transferred act as stiff points, while
the transfer slab acts like a spring support to the transferred
columns. If the structural frame over has moment capacity at
its joints, and thus a stiffness, it will attempt to span over the
‘spring’ support. This reduces the force in the column
supported on the transfer slab. Again, this is not a true
representation of how the structure will act. The propping
sequence of the structure will have a large effect on the stiffness
of the frame supported by the transfer slab during construction
and hence will affect how much permanent load is actually
supported by the transfer slab. This depends on when
temporary props are removed and whether they are temporarily
released and re-propped. A time history analysis could be
performed to take the propping sequence into account, however
the relative stiffness of the frame versus the transfer slab will
also change over time due to creep and shrinkage effects.
Furthermore, if the potential stiffness of the frame within in the
finite element model was to be realised, each connection would
have to be designed for the moment and shear force associated
with the vierendeel type action induced.
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Following a number of reviews, a standardised process for
modelling transfer slabs was developed that accounts for the
phenomenon described above. The Author has noted a
reduction in issues associated with transfer slabs since its
introduction.
Members or Systems that resist Lateral Loads
The following table presents a summary of results from the
evaluation of issues arising in members and systems resisting
lateral loads.
A
B
C
D
E
F
Roof

7

15

47%

No bracing provided
II
No support to top of
Wall
4
15 27%
II
wall
Slab
Discontinuity prevents
4
33 12%
II
diaphragm
load transfer
Major torsion induced
RC Core
2
17 12%
II
on core
Table 2. Results of evaluation of issues found in members or
systems that resist lateral loads.
There are a wide range issues related to lateral loads that may
cause instability of an element or of the structure as a whole.
There were seven projects that had issues with steel framed
roofs. Six of the seven projects had bracing missing on plan or
had discontinuities in the roof bracing system that meant there
was no route back to the vertical lateral stability elements.
These roofs would be detailed for fabrication by a subcontractor, so it is possible that a number of these omissions
would have been picked up prior to construction. The most
likely cause of these omissions is human error.
On four projects there was no lateral restraint to the top of walls
indicated on the drawings below the steel framed roofs.
On two projects the location of RC cores documented on plan
would have resulted in a major torsional moment being induced
onto the RC core, potentially causing instability of the building.
A shear wall was introduced in one instance, in the other a
building expansion joint was moved, which balanced the lateral
loading on the RC cores.
On four projects, the shape of floor diaphragms as documented
prevented the slab transferring lateral loads back to the vertical
shear walls or RC cores. One of these issues occurred on a
major project with a number of buildings over a podium slab
and two storey basement. On this project, expansion joints were
provided in perpendicular directions through the podium level
and level -1 basement slab. However, these expansion joints
prevented equalisation of earth pressures acting on the
basement walls. This lateral earth pressure was too great to be
supported by the RC shear cores that provided lateral stability
against wind loading. To address the issue, a shear connection
across the expansion joint was introduced to allow the RC slab
diaphragms distribute the lateral loads to the perimeter
basement walls as was the original design intent. In assessing
the cause of the issue, there were a number of design teams
working on different buildings on this project and a number of
finite element models were developed to analyse the structures.
In the basement model, pin supports were evident supporting
the top of the RC retaining walls. This was an un-conservative
assumption because of the presence of the expansion joints.

This issue is likely to have been caused by a combination of a
breakdown in communication and human error. It must be
noted that projects of this size in Ireland are rare, and issues not
seen before can manifest due to problems of scale.
On one major city centre site, it was noted that planned future
excavation at an adjacent site would un-balance lateral earth
pressures across the basement. It was possible on this project to
design the lateral resisting systems for an unbalanced earth
pressure, However new projects often require temporary
propping to be provided to ensure stability of adjacent existing
developments. This potential issue has also been picked up by
Dublin City Council in their new basement development policy
document, which includes a requirement for a basement impact
assessment [18].
8

Discontinuity prevents
load transfer

7

No support to top of wall

6

No bracing provided
No holding down straps

5

4

Foundation not designed
for overturning moments

3

Unacceptable torsion due
to location of core
Bracing fails under loading

2

Future excavation would
un-balance earth pressure

1

Inadequate connection to
core

0

Figure 4. Common issues related to lateral loading identified
across projects
Foundations
The following table presents a summary of results from the
evaluation of issues arising in foundations.
A
B C
D
E F
Differential
3
36
8%
/ Human error
settlement
Foundation
insufficient to resist 4
12
33% / Human error
buoyancy
Foundation
insufficient for
4
36
11% / Human error
vertical loads
No restraint to top
2
21
10% / Human error
of pile
Table 3. Results of evaluation of issues found foundations.
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A risk of buoyancy in four projects with basements was
identified where foundations supporting podium areas between
buildings had insufficient dead loading in the structure to
counteract the uplift forces due to ground water pressure. This
issue was found on 33% of projects with basements. These
projects were in Dublin City in close proximity to the river
Liffey where the ground water level is quite close to surface
level.
Four projects contained foundations insufficient to resist
vertical loads. Issues included too few piles being provided,
pads undersized for allowable bearing pressure, or pads
undersized for punching shear. In one case the suspended
ground floor slab was not included in the analysis model, which
resulted in too few piles being provided.
On three projects, the documentation showed one half of the
building supported on rock and the other half on clay. Had the
buildings been constructed in this manner, differential
settlement may have occurred. It is quite possible that these
issues would have been picked up during site inspections,
resulting in an increase to project costs rather than a more
serious outcome. Each of these issues appear to be associated
with human error, where the issue was missed or not
considered.
The following table presents a summary of results from an
evaluation of robustness issues arising in reviews.
A
B C
D
E
F
Precast floor
II
detailing
Steel columns
Lack of
4 36
11% supporting RC
III
Redundancy
structures
Vertical Ties 3 27
11% Masonry walls
II
Table 4. Results of evaluation of issues found with robustness
on projects.
7

20

[1]

[2]

[4]
[5]
[6]

35%

Seven projects had issues with detailing of horizontal ties. Five
of these projects were associated with precast floors onto
precast or masonry walls. The two other projects involved steel
frames where the tie force to be designed for by sub-contractors
was underestimated.
Elements of four projects were considered to have a lack of
sufficient redundancy and required key element design. One of
these projects was a Consequence Class 3 structure, where a
systematic risk assessment was also required to be performed
in accordance with Eurocode 1 [19]. On this project, a corner
column supporting a large floor area was located adjacent to a
turn on a busy bus corridor. In this case, following the review,
the column was designed for accidental vehicular impact.
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